We study a multi-dimensional collective decision under incomplete information. Agents have Euclidean preferences and vote by simple majority on each issue (dimension), yielding the coordinate-wise median. Judicious rotations of the orthogonal axes -the issues that are voted upon -lead to welfare improvements. If the agents' types are drawn from a distribution with independent marginals then, under weak conditions, voting on the original issues is not optimal. If the marginals are identical (but not necessarily independent), then voting …rst on the total sum and next on the di¤erences is often welfare superior to voting on the original issues. We also provide various lower bounds on incentive e¢ ciency: in particular, if agents'types are drawn from a log-concave density with I.I.D. marginals, a second-best voting mechanism attains at least 88% of the …rst-best e¢ ciency. Finally, we generalize our method and some of our insights to preferences derived from distance functions based on inner products.
Introduction
In 1974 the U.S. Congress changed its budgeting process: instead of considering appropriations requests that were voted upon one at a time (bottom-up) which resulted in a gradually determined total level of spending, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act required voting …rst on an overall level of spending, before the determination of budgets for individual programs in subsequent votes (top-down). A large literature in the area of public …nance (see for example the review articles in Poterba and von Hagen [1999] ) has debated the costs and bene…ts of such procedural changes, with particular attention to the size of the expected budget de…cit. 1 We analyze the problem of rede…ning (or bundling) the issues brought to vote in a multi-dimensional collective decision problem. Such methods can increase the welfare of the involved decision makers by allowing them to reach a consensus that was not possible on the original issues.
We study a multi-dimensional collective decision taken by simple majority voting: an example is a legislature that needs to decide on individual budgets for public goods such as, say, education and defense. Other examples are decisions on the geographical location of a desirable facility, or decisions on hiring and project adoption that are based on multi-dimensional attributes.
We adopt the standard spatial model of voting widely used in the political science literature (see for example, Chapter 5 in Austen-Smith and Banks [2005] ), where voters have preferences characterized by ideal points in each dimension, and by a quadratic loss caused by deviations from the ideal point. 2 Voters'ideal points are private information, and we study voting by simple majority on each dimension separately. As we shall see below, this focus yields, in combination with a decision over the dimensions that are the subject of voting, an analysis of more generality than immediately apparent.
Voting by simple majority on each dimension yields the coordinate-wise median of the voters' ideal points. This easily follows from Black's [1948] famous theorem because the induced preferences are single-peaked on each one-dimensional issue. In general, this outcome does not coincide with the …rst-best, the alternative that minimizes the sum of squared distances from the individual ideal points. The …rst-best is the coordinate-wise average (or mean) of the realized ideal points, and thus …rst-best welfare is the corresponding variance (with a minus sign). 1 There was a widespread belief that the new rules would lead to smaller de…cits, and the act was passed almost unanimously in both House and Senate. 2 The main text deals with the two-dimensional case, while the generalization to more than two dimensions is in an Appendix.
The …rst-best is not implementable: each agent has an incentive to try to move the average closer to his/her ideal point by exaggerating his/her position on one or more issues. 3 Given the tension between …rst-best on the one hand and implementable outcomes on the other, how well does voting by simple majority perform in terms of welfare? A classical inequality due to Hotelling and Solomons [1932] implies that, for any distribution of preferences, voting by simple majority on any given issues achieves at least 50% of the …rst-best welfare.
The main insight of the present paper is that a judicious choice of the issues that are actually put to vote (while maintaining voting by simple majority, with its desirable incentive properties) can signi…cantly improve welfare. 4 For example, instead of voting on two separate issues, the legislature could vote on a total budget, and then on a division of that budget between the two issues -just as Congress started to do in 1974. More generally, we model the repackaging and bundling of issues by rotations of the orthogonal axes that de…ne what is put to vote. For example, suppose voters care about two separate main issues, but they actually vote on the budget of two agencies that overlap in their responsibility over these two issues. Rotations correspond then to the shifting of jurisdictions among the two agencies: they change the mix of issues under the control of each agency. In in ‡uential work, Shepsle [1979] argued that the division of a complex decision into several di¤erent jurisdictions (germaneness), creates stable equilibria that would not be possible in a general, unconstrained collective decision model. His main examples are legislative committees in the U.S. congress. Viewed in light of Shepsle's theory, our goal is to endogenize the choice of jurisdictions in order to improve welfare, an issue that has not received much attention in formal studies.
A basic technical observation is that the mean is rotation equivariant (i.e., the mean after rotation is obtained by rotating the original mean) but the coordinatewise median is not. 5 As a consequence, a rotation of the axes may decrease the dis-we focus here on the limit case where the number of voters is in…nite.
Our main results are: 1) If the agents'ideal points in one dimension are independently distributed from the ideal points in the other dimension then, under weak conditions on the distribution of preferences, voting on the original issues is sub-optimal; that is, a re-packaging of the issues brought to vote via rotation (which necessarily creates some correlation among the ideal points) increases welfare. This parallels the non-optimality of separate sales in the multi-product monopoly problem: some form of mixed bundling is always superior to separate sales (see McAfee, McMillan and Whinston [1989] ).
2) If the marginals of the distribution of agents'ideal points are identically distributed (not necessarily independently), we provide su¢ cient conditions under which the 45-degree rotation welfare is superior to no rotation. The conditions are satis…ed by common distribution with I.I.D. marginals. We show that, with I.I.D. marginals, the 45-degree rotation is always a critical point, and also provide su¢ cient conditions for the 45-degree rotation to be welfare maximizing. A key observation for these results is that, under the symmetry of the marginals, the 45-degree rotation entirely eliminates the con ‡ict arising between e¢ ciency and majority voting in one dimension -all remaining con ‡ict is concentrated in the other, orthogonal dimension.
3) We provide various lower bounds on incentive e¢ ciency for large, non-parametric families of distributions of ideal points (such as unimodal distributions, distributions with an increasing hazard rate, etc.). For example, if agents'ideal points are drawn from a log-concave density with I.I.D. marginals, a voting mechanism that involves a 45-degree rotation of the original dimensions attains at least 88% of the …rst-best e¢ ciency. 4) We extend our method to the more general class of preferences induced by distance functions generated by inner-product norms. In particular, for weighted Euclidean norms, we show that voting on independent issues remains sub-optimal under the same su¢ cient conditions as for the Euclidean preferences.
It is possible to perform a similar analysis for goals other than e¢ ciency, e.g., de…ne jurisdictions that serve other purposes, such as the self-interest of an agenda setter, or of a coalition of voters. Ferejohn and Krehbiel [1987] focused on controlling budgetary growth rather than e¢ ciency, and they observed that the 1974 budget reform can be represented by a 45-degree rotation of the coordinates on which voting takes place. For that goal, we o¤er here precise conditions comparing the top-down and bottom-up procedures in terms of the total budget they produce, and we show that the budgeting reform can unambiguously improve welfare while having a mixed [1928] ) and Hadamard. impact on the budget size.
To see how our results may …t practical voting environments, consider a legislative committee that decides on spending on several items. Each committee member has a preferred expenditure for each item. If the items are independent (i.e, the preferred expenditure level on one item is uncorrelated with the preferred one on another item) then it is not optimal to directly vote on the proposed expenditures. Instead, it may be better to vote on the budgets of two agencies that have some overlapping jurisdictions representing a particular mix of the two issues (this is a non-zero rotation in our framework). In another example, if a committee …nances regional hospitals, say, that have similar sizes and serve similar purposes, our analysis suggests that it is better to …rst decide the total budget for these hospitals and then divide it among hospitals. Finally, if a government, say, has to fund an activity for multiple years, it may be better …rst vote on a multi-year budget and then decide how to allocate the total budget among di¤erent years.
Related Literature
The existence of a Condorcet winner is rare in multi-dimensional models of voting (Kramer [1973] ). Kramer [1972] observed, however, that voting in a variety of institutions is often sequential, issue by issue, and he established the existence of a sophisticated voting equilibrium if voters' preferences are continuous, convex and separable. The coordinate-wise median -obtained by simple-majority voting in each dimension -constitutes a basic instance of a structure induced equilibrium in the spirit of Shepsle [1979] . 7 Technically, our contribution builds upon and relates to several important and elegant contributions due to Moulin [1980] , Border and Jordan [1983] , Kim and Rousch [1984] , and Peters, van der Stel and Storcken [1992] . In a one-dimensional setting with single-peaked preferences, Moulin considered mechanisms that depend on reported peaks, and characterized the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC), anonymous and Pareto e¢ cient mechanisms: each mechanism in this class is obtained by choosing the median among the n reported peaks of the real voters and the peaks of a set of n 1 "phantom"voters (these are …xed by the mechanism, and do not vary with the reports). 8 Border and Jordan [1983] removed Moulin's assumption whereby mechanisms depend only on peaks, and generalized Moulin's …nding 7 In a multi-dimensional voting model with common interest, aggregate uncertainty, and two truthmotivated candidates, McMurray [2018] shows that, in equilibrium, multiple issues are consistently bundled along the 45-degree line (the major diagonal in his model). 8 Relaxing Pareto e¢ ciency yields the same characterization, but requires n + 1 phantoms.
to a multi-dimensional setting with separable and quadratic preferences: each DIC mechanism is decomposable into a collection of one-dimensional DIC mechanisms, each described by the location of the phantom voters in the respective dimension (see also Barbera, Gul and Stacchetti [1993] ). 9 Gershkov, Moldovanu and Shi [2017] analyzed welfare maximization in a onedimensional setting with cardinal utilities, and derived the ex-ante welfare maximizing placement of phantoms. They also showed how to avoid the phantom interpretation by implementing Moulin's mechanisms via a sequential, binary voting procedure together with a ‡exible quali…ed majority schedule. 10 Combining their result with the Border-Jordan decomposition yields the welfare maximizing mechanism for multidimensional settings with separable and quadratic preferences. But, the ensuing solution, described by an optimal placement of phantoms in each dimension, is not satisfactory from a practical point of view: it implies that each issue (dimension) in each multi-dimensional problem must be voted upon according to a particular institution that is sensitive to both utilities and distribution of types. Such ‡exibility may be di¢ cult, if not impossible, to achieve in practice. Instead, we …x here an ubiquitous institution -voting by simple majority on each issue -but we allow ‡exibility in the design of the issues that are actually put to vote. Such a limited form of agenda design is common in practice, and, as we shall see, has important welfare consequences.
The simplest multi-dimensional setting is the one with Euclidean preferences: intuitively, the presence of spherically symmetric preferences does not a-priori determine the dimensions of the Border and Jordan decomposition into one-dimensional mechanisms. Indeed, Kim and Rousch [1984] showed that the set of continuous, anonymous and DIC mechanisms can be described by performing the Border-Jordan analysis subsequent to any translation of the origin and any rotation of the orthogonal axes. 11 Peters, van der Stel and Storcken [1992] showed that, for two dimensions with odd number of voters, voting by simple majority in each dimension (after any translation/rotation of the plane) is also Pareto e¢ cient. Finally, it is also instructive to compare our results to those in the classical papers by Caplin and Nalebu¤ ( [1988] , [1991] ). 13 These authors did not consider incomplete information and incentive constraints. Instead, motivated by the instability of multidimensional voting, they considered the e¤ect of super-majority requirements on the stability of the spatial mean. For a large number of voters and for a log-concave density governing the distribution of types (and also for other, more general forms of concavity), Caplin and Nalebu¤ showed that, once established as status-quo, the mean cannot be displaced by another alternative if the selection of that alternative requires a super-majority of at least 64% (or 1 1 e ). In other words, any coalition that prefers an alternative over the mean contains less than 64% of the voters, and is thus not e¤ective.
As mentioned above, for the log-concave case with I.I.D. marginals, our results display a mechanism that is incentive compatible for any (odd) number of voters and that achieves at least 88% of the …rst-best utility when this number goes to in…nity. Thus, issue by issue simple majority voting on appropriately de…ned dimensions constitutes an intuitive and incentive compatible institutional arrangement that is almost e¢ cient in this case. Moreover, the relative e¢ ciency of this mechanism increases, and tends to 100%, when we increase the number of dimensions of the underlying problem.
Although our setting bears some similarity to multi-dimensional cheap talk, the logic of welfare gains is very di¤erent here. In those models, the multiplicity of issues helps because it improves information transmission between the sender(s) and the receiver. In a model with two senders Battaglini [2002] shows that, as long as the two senders'ideal points are linearly independent, full information revelation is possible by carefully choosing dimensions to exploit the con ‡ict between senders. In a onesender model, Chakraborty and Harbaugh [2007] show that the sender can credibly convey his ranking of di¤erent issues to the receiver. In our model rotations address a very di¤erent con ‡ict, one between simple majority voting and e¢ ciency.
The Model
We consider n (odd) agents who collectively decide about two issues, X and Y , on a convex region D R 2 . Each agent's ideal position on these two issues is given by a peak t i = (x i ; y i ); i = 1; 2; :::; n: A utilitarian planner would choose v 2 D to maximize the average of the agents' ex ante utilities, or equivalently, minimize the expected average squared distance from the voters'peaks:
subject to agents'incentive constraints. Ignoring the agents'incentives, the planner would choose a point u that minimizes the average of ex post distances:
which we will refer to as the …rst-best solution. For each …xed realization (t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n ), it is well known that the …rst-best solution is simply the mean of the ideal points
Hence, the …rst-best (per capita) expected utility is the variance (with negative sign)
In Section 5, we shall extend our analysis to preferences generated by other norms induced by inner products.
Re-packaging Issues via Rotations
We consider voting by simple majority on each separate dimension. Our focus on simple majority voting stems from its wide applicability and its actual use in practice. We do not a priori restrict the issues on the ballot to be X and Y . Instead, new issues can be created through "re-packaging and bundling"the basic issues X and Y .
We model packaging and bundling of issues through rotations in the plane. Recall that, for …xed Cartesian coordinates, rotating a point (x; y) 2 R 2 counter-clockwise by an angle of can be represented by the multiplication of the vector (x; y) with a rotation matrix R ( ). The resulting, rotated vector (z ; z + ) is given then by
Equivalently, one can obtain (z ; z + ) by rotating the original Cartesian coordinates clockwise around the …xed origin by an angle of to obtain new orthogonal coordinates, and then projecting (x; y) to the new coordinates.
Let (Z ; Z + ) denote the new random vector obtained from rotating the random vector (X; Y ) by an angle of :
Voters then vote on the new issues Z and Z + , instead of the original issues X and Y .
14 By the simple majority rule, the voting outcome will be (m ( ; t 1 ; :::; t n ) ; m + ( ; t 1 ; :::; t n )) where m ( ; t 1 ; :::; t n ) = median (x 1 cos y 1 sin ; :::; x n cos y n sin ),
m + ( ; t 1 ; :::; t n ) = median (x 1 sin + y 1 cos ; :::; x n sin + y n cos ),
are the marginal medians after the rotation.
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It is easy to verify that the mean t of t 1 ; :::; t n is rotation equivariant, i.e. the mean of rotated peaks is simply the rotated mean of the original peaks. In marked contrast, the marginal medians (m ( ; t 1 ; :::; t n ) ; m + ( ; t 1 ; :::; t n )) are not rotation equivariant, i.e., rotating and taking medians is not the same as taking medians and rotating. Therefore, rotations are instruments by which the planner may use to in ‡uence welfare. To illustrate, consider Figure 1 below with three voters. A, B, and C are voters'ideal points. Original coordinates are drawn in green, rotated coordinates are drawn in red. The green star is the outcome of voting along the original axes (x; y). The red one is the outcome of voting along the rotated axes (x 0 ; y 0 ). It is clear that the mean of ideal points is rotation equivariant, the median is not.
14 We abuse here notation by denoting by the same capital letters both the underlying dimensions (or issues) and the random variables governing the distribution of peaks on those respective dimensions. 15 Other than marginal median, there are several other multivariate generalizations of univariate median. See Small [1990] for a review of di¤erent de…nitions of multi-dimensional medians and their (lack of) equivariance properties. 
. Z is symmetric, so its median and mean are both equal to zero, and the mean of Z + equals
In contrast, the median of Z + is not equal to
To see this, note that the density of X + Y is given by
Since
More generally, we could also consider an additional translation of the origin, say by a vector w, to obtain new orthogonal coordinates (and thus create new issues).
The joint operation of rotation and translation can also be represented by a linear matrix. 16 But, medians (and means) are translation equivariant, and thus there is no extra welfare advantage from such translations. Therefore, we focus below on the family of rotations -the linear isometries with determinant +1 that …x the origindescribed by the angle of rotation relative to standard Cartesian coordinates.
The Set of Voting Mechanisms
For any rotation angle 2 [0; 2 ], we de…ne the direct marginal median mechanism ' as ' (t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n ) = (m ( ; t 1 ; ::; t n ) ; m + ( ; t 1 ; ::; t n )) ;
where (m ( ; t 1 ; ::; t n ) ; m + ( ; t 1 ; ::; t n )) is the marginal median with respect to rotation and reported peaks t i as de…ned in (3) and (4). Since both rotations and medians are continuous functions, ' (t 1 ; t 2 ; :::; t n ) is continuous in and in all its other arguments. A direct revelation mechanism (t i ; t i ) is dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DIC) if, for any voter i, any realizations t i and t i ; and any reporting strategy pro…let i (t i ) of other voters, voter i's utility
by truthfully revealing his type t i . It is easily seen that the direct revelation mechanism ' de…ned in (5) is DIC. Surprisingly, as shown by Kim and Roush [1984] and Peters et al. [1992] , the set of marginal median mechanisms (for all possible rotations) coincides with the entire class of anonymous, Pareto e¢ cient and DIC mechanisms.
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This provides a complementary justi…cation for our focus on simple-majority voting mechanisms. The mechanism ' can be decentralized (via an indirect mechanism) by …rst de…n-ing the issues (via rotations) and then voting sequentially by simple majority, one issue at a time, using a binary, sequential voting procedure with a convex agenda (such as 16 This set of general transformation matrices (rotation and translation) is called the special orthogonal group for the plane, and is denoted by SO(2). Each matrix in SO (2) is an orthogonal matrix. It is special because the determinant of each matrix is +1, whereas the determinant could be 1 for other orthogonal transformations such as re ‡ections. Rotations form the subgroup that …xes the origin. 17 A mechanism is anonymous if, for any pro…le of reports (t i ; t i ), (t 1 ; :::; t i ; :::; t n ) = t p(1) ; :::; t p(i) ; :::; t p(n) ; where p is any permutation of the set f1; :::; ng. A mechanism is Pareto e¢ cient (or Pareto optimal) if, for any pro…le of reports (t i ; t i ), there is no alternative v such that jjt i vjj 2 jjt i (t i ; t i )jj 2 for all i, with strict inequality for at least one agent. Note that their characterization fails in higher dimensions because anonymous, Pareto e¢ cient and DIC mechanisms need not exist. Hence, our analysis can be extended to higher dimensional problems, but the solution need not be ex-post Pareto e¢ cient.
those used by all democratic legislatures). 18 The overall outcome does not depend on the order in which the issues are put up to vote, and is the vector of marginal medians (m ( ; t 1 ; :::; t n ) ; m + ( ; t 1 ; :::; t n )). This forms an incidence of the structure induced equilibrium à la Shepsle [1979] . Two rotation angles, = 0 and = =4; are of particular interest and have natural interpretations. When = 0, voters are asked to vote on the original issues X and Y . For = =4 we have m ( =4; t 1 ; :::; t n ) = p 2 2 median (x 1 y 1 ; :::; x n y n ), m + ( =4; t 1 ; :::; t n ) = p 2 2 median (x 1 + y 1 ; :::; x n + y n ).
Therefore, under the =4 rotation, the vote is on issues X + Y and X Y , rather than on X and Y . Once voters have decided on X + Y and X Y , the planner can then obviously recover X and Y . The two-step voting procedure associated with the =4-rotation resembles the "top-down"budgeting procedure widely used in practice: …rst a total budget is determined, and then it is allocated among several items. On the other hand, the voting procedure associated with the 0-rotation resembles the "bottom-up" budgeting procedure: agents vote on separate budgets for individual items, and the total budget is gradually obtained as the sum of the individual budgets.
Remark 1 We focus here on orthogonal coordinates. This is without loss of generality: for any equilibrium outcome obtained by voting along coordinates generated by a non-orthogonal base, there always exists an orthogonal base that yields the same voting outcome. The di¤erence is that under a non-orthogonal base, the order in which the issues are put up to vote does matter. To illustrate, consider the following standard implementation of the =4 rotation in practice: after the total sum (X + Y ) was determined, voters are asked to vote on X (or on Y ) rather than on the orthogonal di¤erence (X Y ). We show that as long as (X + Y ) is voted upon …rst, any issue voted upon at the second stage that is not colinear with X + Y will yield the same equilibrium outcome as under voting according to (X Y ). To see this, consider the case where voters vote …rst on X + Y; and then on X; and the second-stage strategy of voter i with ideal point (x i ; y i ) : The …rst stage decision imposes then a budget line (the purple dash line in Figure 2 ) on which the …nal voting outcome must lie. Let A and B denote the points obtained by projecting (x i ; y i ) on the budget line, and on the X axis, respectively, and let D denote the projection A to the X axis. Then, at the second stage voting on X, voter i's dominant strategy is to vote for point D rather than point B : whenever i is pivotal, voting D yields point A on the budget line, which is closest to his ideal point. On the other hand, A is exactly the point that i would have voted for if the second stage vote were on the di¤erence X Y . Note that the above argument is independent of the number of voters and can be easily generalized to other non-orthogonal bases.
The Limit Case when the Number of Agents Is Large
The full probabilistic optimization problem can be rewritten as
:::
We focus here on the solution to problem (P 0 ) when the number of agents is large. The resulting optimal mechanism will be incentive compatible, Pareto e¢ cient and anonymous for any (odd) number of voters. For I.I.D. random variables fX i g 1 i=1 with …nite mean X and variance 2 X , we know from the central limit theorem that
Bahadur (1966) shows that the quantiles of large samples display a similar behavior. In particular,
where X (n+1)=2:n is the median order statistic, and where m X is the median of the distribution. Thus, as n goes to in…nity, the sample median converges to the median of the underlying distribution and, of course, the sample mean converges to the mean. By applying the above limit results to our setting, we obtain that, as n ! 1,
Furthermore, since the norm jj jj is continuous, we obtain that, as n ! 1,
where the two coordinates of the rotated mean are ( ) = X cos Y sin , and + ( ) = X sin + Y cos :
Therefore, in the limit where n is very large, the problem becomes
In other words, we look for the rotation that creates the marginal median vector with the minimum distance from the mean. For most parts of the analysis below, it will be convenient to normalize the means of X and Y to be zero -such a normalization is without loss of generality because of the translational equivariance of both mean and median. Let us de…ne the normalized random variablesX andỸ as
The corresponding normalized marginal medians (m ( ) ;m + ( )) arẽ
We further note that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to rotations in the interval [0; =2]. That is because, for any 2 [ =2; 2 ] that minimizes the planner's objective, there exists 0 2 [0; =2] that attains the same minimum. 19 Hence, the planner's problem can be rewritten as
Since variances are …xed, the planner's goal under this normalization is simply to …nd the rotation resulting in a marginal median vector with minimum norm. To simplify notation, we shall drop the tilde symbol for normalized random variables where no confusion can arise.
Remark 2 We would like to comment here on the feasibility of the …rst-best solution.
1. With a continuum of voters, the planner could, in principle, dictate the mean as the collective choice without seeking any input from the voters. But, this would require detailed knowledge about the joint distribution of individuals'preferences. In contrast, voting by simple majority in each dimension is practical and indeed often observed in reality because it is always incentive compatible, and because its execution does not require any prior knowledge about the distribution. None of our theorems or propositions (e.g., Theorems 1-3, Propositions 1-3) requires the planner to know the exact distribution: it is su¢ cient to know that the joint distribution belongs to a broad class.
2. If the number of voters is …nite, the …rst-best solution, de…ned as the sample mean of the voters' ideal points, is not implementable because each agent can advantageously move the mean towards her ideal point by reporting a false peak. The individual in ‡uence on the mean is unbounded (unless the distribution of peaks is on a bounded interval). Thus, even if the number of voters is large, the possibility to tilt the mean in one's favor may still be substantial.
Sub-Optimality of Voting on Independent Issues
In this subsection, we assume that the unrotated marginals X and Y are independent. We work on the normalized version of the planner's problem (P 2 ) and show that the zero-rotation yields a local maximum of the norm of the normalized marginal median, i.e., it leads to a local utility minimum.
Theorem 1 Assume that X and Y are independent. The rotation with angle = 0 is a local utility minimum if 
where M; m; are mode, median and mean, respectively. Then the rotation with angle = 0 is a local utility minimum. 
and if it satis…es the following local second-order condition
The proof veri…es that m 0 (0) = m 0 + (0) = 0 (so condition (7) is trivially satis…ed), and that condition (6) in Theorem 1 implies condition (8).
The geometric intuition of the sub-optimality of voting on independent issues is illustrated in Figure 3 
0, F Y is locally convex at m Y . Therefore, for su¢ ciently small , the curve F Y (m Y + (m X x) tan ) with x 2 [a 1 ; a 2 ] lies above the tangent line
As a result, for su¢ ciently small , we have
as desired. The argument for the other dimension is analogous.
Intuitively 
The =4-Rotation
In this subsection, we assume that X and Y are identically (but not necessarily independently) distributed. By symmetry,
Hence, the =4-rotation is a natural candidate for improving welfare. It completely eliminates the con ‡ict arising between e¢ ciency and incentive compatibility along one dimension -all remaining con ‡ict is concentrated in the other dimension, as illustrated in the following …gure (assuming m X > X = 0) where (m X ; m Y ) is the unrotated median and the red star is the =4-rotated median m + ( =4): Figure 4 . The =4-rotation with symmetric marginals.
Proposition 1 Suppose that X and Y are I.I.D., and the density f X satis…es the following regularity condition:
Then = =4 is a critical point, i.e., it satis…es the …rst order condition.
Proof. See Appendix A. The above regularity condition is satis…ed if the distribution has a bounded support or a thin tail. If we could verify second-order conditions either locally or globally, then Proposition 1 could tell us whether = =4 is a local or global utility maximum. Unfortunately, the second order conditions, evaluated at = =4, turn out to be very elusive.
Our next result o¤ers su¢ cient conditions for the optimality of the =4-rotation. It requires the following de…nition. is Schur-convex in (sin 2 ; cos 2 ) for all 2 0; 4 and z 2 [0; m X ].
Proof. See Appendix A. If Pr (X sin + Y cos z) is Schur-concave for all 2 0; 4 , and if the rotated median is always below the mean, it must hold that
Hence, the distance between the mean and the rotated median m X sin +Y cos is smallest when = =4. The su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 2 only involve the model's primitives (i.e., the distributions of types) and can be, in principle, checked for any distribution.
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For example, we veri…ed that Pr (X sin + Y cos z) is Schur-concave if X and Y are I.I.D. exponential and thus the =4-rotation is globally optimal in that case.
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For other standard distributions such as gamma, Pareto and Rayleigh, we used Mathematica to plot the aggregate expected welfare as a function of the rotation angle 2 [0; =2]. Our simulations suggest that the =4-rotation is optimal for these distributions, but we were unable to analytically prove it. In general, the =4-rotation may not be optimal, as illustrated by Example 2 below. Therefore, some restrictions on the symmetric marginals are indeed necessary for the optimality of the =4-rotation. non-negative I.I.D. random variables with a log-concave density then Pr(aX + bY z) is known to be Schur-concave function of (a 2 ; b 2 ) for all z (see Karlin and Rinott [1983] ). We cannot directly use this result because of the non-negativity restriction. 22 The veri…cation details for the exponential distribution are available upon request. Therefore, the =4-rotation is strictly dominated by the 0-rotation. Since the welfare dominance is strict, we can approximate the discrete distribution by a continuous distribution and maintain it.
When does "Top-Down" Dominate "Bottom-Up"?
We now compare the expected utility under the =4-rotation with that under the 0-rotation. As is apparent from Assuming that X and Y are I.I.D., we present below a simple su¢ cient condition that simultaneously guarantees m X < (>) X and m X + m Y < (>) m X+Y . 23 The need to control for sub/super-additivity of medians parallel the conditions on secondhighest order statistics for bundling in auctions (see Palfrey [1983] ).
Proposition 3 Suppose that X and Y are I.I.D. and that m X 6 = X . The expected utility at = 4 exceeds the expected utility at = 0 if either
23 As is illustrated in Example 1, both condition m X < X and the super-additivity condition m X + m Y < m X+Y hold for the exponential distribution which is strictly concave. We show in Section 7.5 of Appendix A that the super-additivity condition is satis…ed for the gamma distribution (a generalization of the exponential) and the Rayleigh distribution, where the su¢ cient condition (9) may not be easily checked, or does not hold. There we also construct, by using a copula, an example where independence is not necessary for the =4-rotation to dominate the 0-rotation.
or
In particular, condition (9) implies m X < X and m X + m Y < m X+Y , and is satis…ed if F X is strictly concave. Condition (10) implies m X > X and m X + m Y > m X+Y , and is satis…ed if F X is strictly convex.
Proof. See Appendix A. It is worth noting that van Zwet [1979] shows that condition (9) implies X > m X > M X and (10) implies X < m X < M X . It follows from Corollary 1 that each of the two conditions is also su¢ cient for the zero-rotation to be sub-optimal.
Remark 3 Whenever the median function is super (sub)-additive, the top-down procedure where a total budget is determined …rst leads to a higher (lower) overall budget than the bottom-up procedure where votes are item-by-item and where the total budget is gradually determined.
4 Bounds on Relative E¢ ciency
In this section we provide several lower bounds on the (relative) e¢ ciency loss of the marginal median mechanisms augmented by rotations. We keep the assumption that the number of agents is large. The various bounds are obtained under di¤erent distributional assumptions governing the distribution of voter's ideal points, and the proofs use several classical statistical inequalities, and some more recent concentration inequalities. In particular, for the logconcave case studied by Caplin and Nalebu¤ ( [1988] , [1991] ), the lower bound is 88% of the …rst-best utility.
Note that each assertion in the following Theorem holds for a large class of distributions, and therefore that the results do not require exact knowledge of the particular distribution (as long as it is known that it belongs to the respective class). In particular, the optimal rotation achieves, in each case, a possibly higher relative e¢ ciency.
Assume that ideal points are distributed such that the marginals are given by random variables (X; Y ) where X and Y are not necessarily identical, and are potentially correlated. Since the results heavily use statistical results that establish relations between the mean, median and variance, we work here with the non-normalized variables (so that the role of the mean and its relations to the other statistics does not get obscured by the normalization we used above). The …rst-best expected utility, 24 Note that this question is not identical to the question of utility comparisons.
attained by choosing the mean in each coordinate, decreases as variances increase and is given by
The expected utility of rotated medians with angle is given by
Thus, the relative e¢ ciency of the rotation with angle is given by:
Two forces play here a role: on the one hand, a distribution that is concentrated around a central location (such as the mean or the median) will have a small di¤erence between mean and median, which tends to increase the relative e¢ ciency. On the other hand, such a distribution also has a low variance so that the di¤erence between mean and median plays a bigger overall role. 25 The …rst-best outcome can be attained by majority voting (in the limit with a large number of agents) if the distributions of both X and Y are symmetric around their respective means (e.g., both are normally distributed). In this case we have ( ) = m ( ) and + ( ) = m + ( ). A random variable X has increasing failure rate (IFR) if its hazard rate f (x) = (1 F (x)) is increasing in x. . Thus, when X and Y are independent, EF ( 4 ) 2 3
. In the polar, co-monotonic scenario, EF ( 4 ) = EF (0) 1 2 and welfare cannot be improved by rotation. Proof. 1. A classical inequality due to Hotelling and Solomons [1932] says that the squared distance between the mean and median of any random variable is always less than the variance:
Therefore,
2 sin cos Cov(X; Y );
We obtain the universal bound:
2. For the class of unimodal distributions the squared distance between mean and median is at most variance (see Basu and DasGupta [1997] ). Thus, for such distributions we get:
3. For the class of distributions with an increasing failure rate (IFR), if X m X , then we obtain from Rychlik [2000] that Assume that (X 1 ; Y 1 ) and (X 2 ; Y 2 ) belong to the same Frechet class M (F 1 ; F 2 ) of bivariate distributions with …xed marginals F 1 and F 2 : Moreover, assume that (X 1 ; Y 1 ) P QD (X 2 ; Y 2 ) where P QD stands for the positive quadrant order (see Lehmann [1966] ). This stochastic order measures the amount of positive dependence of the underlying random vectors. 27 We obtain that all one-dimensional variances are identical, but that Cov(X 1 ; Y 1 ) Cov(X 2 ; Y 2 ): Thus, the worst case e¢ ciency bound is higher when the variates are less positive dependent. In particular, for given marginals, the highest worst-case e¢ ciency of the 4 rotation is achieved for the I.I.D. case where Cov(X; Y ) = 0, and where:
The polar case to independence is the case where X and Y are co-monotonic. Then their covariance is maximized for given marginals, and their convolution is quantileadditive (see Kaas et al. [2002] ). In other words, quantiles and thus medians (i.e., the 50% quantile) are linear functions. Hence we obtain for the median that m + ( 4 ) = p 2m X : Hence,
and we obtain EF ( 4 ) = EF (0) 1 2 :
This holds analogously for any other rotation. 5. Consider now the I.I.D. case with log-concave densities. 28 Then X and Y are unimodal. Their convolution is log-concave (Prekopa [1973] ), and hence also unimodal. 29 Let f X = f Y denote the respective log-concave densities. Bobkov and Ledoux [2014] prove that:
On the other hand, Ball and Böröczky [2010] prove that:
27 It is implied, for example, by the supermodular order. 28 Note that any log-concave distribution on the plane yields log-concave marginals (Prekopa [1973] ). 29 The convolution of unimodal densities need not be unimodal. But the convolution of X and Y is unimodal for any Y if and only if X is log-concave (see Ibragimov [1956] ). 30 Interestingly enough, the left hand side of the inequality applies to any probabiliy density on the real line.
Combining the two inequalities above yields
The e¢ ciency bound in the log-concave case becomes then
The above calculations also show that the improvement obtained by rotation may be signi…cant. Just to give one example, consider the original (e.g., unrotated) distributions for which the Hotelling-Solomons bound is achieved with equality. 31 Then, the welfare in the I.I.D. case without rotation is exactly half of the …rst-best welfare, while the welfare following the 45 degree rotation is at least two-thirds of the original …rst best, yielding an improvement of at least 30%.
In Appendix B, we show how the above bounds can be obtained for the case of more dimensions. For example, in the I.I.D, case, the relative e¢ ciency tends to 1 when the number of dimensions becomes in…nite.
Extension to Other Utility Functions
In this section we brie ‡y illustrate how our method can be applied to a more general class of utility functions that are based on a distance generated by an inner product. Thus, we assume that the utility of agent i with peak t i from decision v 2D R 2 is given by
where jj jj I is some inner-product norm, and where is a strictly monotonically increasing function.
Since inner-product norms are strictly convex, choosing a marginal median with respect to any orthogonal coordinates yields a DIC mechanism (see Peters et al. [1993] ). 32 Recall that two vectors are orthogonal if their inner-product (that induces the distance function) is zero.
31 This is a discrete distribution concentrated on two points. But, it can be easily approximated by continuous distribution that satisfy the bound with almost equality, for any needed degree of precision. 32 These authors also show that, as in the case of the Euclidean norm in the plane, the class of marginal medians coincides with the class of DIC, anonymous and Pareto e¢ cient mechanims.
For the Euclidean norm, every rotation is an isometry that …xes the origin and preserves orthogonality and orientation: it transforms a basis of orthogonal vectors into another such basis, and each oriented orthogonal basis is obtained (modulo translation) from another via a suitable rotation.
In order to proceed in an analogous fashion, we need to …rst identify the set of isometries: for any inner product norm jj jj I this is always an in…nite multiplicative group (see Garcia-Roig [1997] ). Because medians and welfare measures that are based on distances are translation equivariant, it is enough, as above, to characterize the sub-group of isometries that …x the origin and that preserve orientation (i.e., their corresponding matrices have determinant +1). We start with the simplest case.
Weighted Euclidean Norm
An agent with ideal point t i = (x i ; y i ) has a weighted Euclidean preference over points v = (x; y) given by
with > 0. Note that, without loss of generality, we can always normalize one of the weights to be +1 without changing the underlying (ordinal) preferences. Let
and de…ne an inner-product and its associated norm by:
h(x 1 ; y 1 ); (x 2 ; y 2 )i (x 1 ; y 1 )M (x 2 ; y 2 ) T ;
The "unit circle"is here an ellipse 2 x 2 + y 2 = 1;
with axes parallel to the standard Cartesian coordinate axes. Isometries that …x the origin leave this ellipse invariant (i.e., a point on the ellipse is translated to another point on the ellipse) and can be represented by generalized "rotation"matrices of the form
While the mean in each coordinate is still the …rst-best, the welfare measure changes to incorporate the weight . By normalizing the mean to zero, the welfare maximization problem becomes:
where m ( ) = median (X cos 1 Y sin );
As before, it is straightforward to verify that the minimum attained by any angle 2 [ =2; 2 ] can be attained by an angle 2 [0; =2]. Hence, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to 2 [0; =2]. Instead of = =4; the rotation that yields m ( ) = 0 is de…ned here by cos = 1 sin , = arctan :
We now show that Theorem 1 continues to hold:
Theorem 3 Assume that X and Y are independent. The rotation with angle = 0 is a local utility minimum if
Proof. See Appendix A. It is also straightforward to derive e¢ ciency bounds. Here are two examples: 1) The universal bound based on the Hotelling-Solomons inequality (without any assumption on the underlying random variables) remains 1 2 , independently of . 2) If X and Y are independent, using the generalized rotation where = arctan , we obtain
We depict below the bound as a function of (recall that EF ( 4 ) 2 3 with = 1). Note that the bound tends back to the universal Hotelling-Solomons bound 1 2 for ! 0 and for ! 1. This is intuitive since in those limit cases one dimension becomes irrelevant and we obtain in the limit a one-dimensional voting problem where "rotations"cannot help. 
General Inner Product Norm
Consider next a general norm de…ned by an inner-product. Such a norm is generated by a symmetric, positive de…nite matrix Q:
The "unit circle"is now an ellipse that is possibly tilted with respect to the standard coordinates. Let A Q be the orthogonal matrix representing the change of variables that diagonalizes Q; and let M Q be the obtained diagonal matrix. 33 Then M Q is the matrix of a weighted Euclidean inner product, as explained above. The set of isometries that …x the origin and preserve orientation is thus given here by the composition:
where R M Q ( ) is the set of generalized rotations that keep invariant the untilted unit ellipse associated to the diagonal matrix M Q , as explained in the previous subsection. Note that the unit circle (i.e, ellipse) of this norm has now axes that are parallel to the coordinate axes de…ned by the change of variables A Q . In particular, the relevant "zero rotation" is the one corresponding to these new variables; it is sub-optimal if the distribution of peaks has independent projections on these coordinates (rather than on the standard Cartesian ones).
Concluding Remarks
A re-de…nition of issues facilitates the search for consensus among ex-ante con ‡icting interests. We have shown that voting by simple majority on each dimension becomes a highly e¤ective aggregation mechanism when combined with a judicious choice of the issues that are put up for vote. Our study endogenizes the process by which a "structure induced equilibrium" can be reached in a complex multi-dimensional collective decision problem with incomplete information about preferences. While we have focused on welfare maximization, other goals (such as maximizing the utility of an agenda setter) can be analyzed by the same methods.
7 Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
In order to show that = 0 is suboptimal, it is su¢ cient to show that
and that m 00 (0)m (0) + (m 0 (0)) 2 + m 00
By the de…nition of m + ( ) ;
Since the above identity holds for all , we take the derivative with respect to and obtain
Taking the second derivative with respect to , we obtain 
If = 0, then conditions (13) and (14) reduce to
and
and follows from (16) that
Similarly, we can write 
Since m (0) = m X , we have
Therefore, the …rst-order condition (11) 
As a result, condition (12) is equivalent to
Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for the sub-optimality of zero rotation is
Proof of Proposition 1
If X and Y are I.I.D., then we have
Therefore, = =4 is a critical point if
Recall (13) from the proof of Theorem 1 that
Hence, if X and Y are I.I.D. and = =4, we have
It follows from the convolution of the distributions for X and Y that p 2m
Furthermore, (18) implies that, for all 2 [1=2; 1],
which implies m p
Condition (17) then follows immediately, and thus the =4-rotation is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that F X (m X + ") + F X (m X ") 1 for all " > 0. The other case is completely analogous. We …rst use an argument by van Zwet [1979] to claim that m X < X . Note that
It follows from m X 6 = X that m X < X . It also implies that F X (m X x) + F X (m X + x) 1 < 0 for some set of x with positive measure. Next, we use an argument adapted from Watson and Gordon [1986] to prove that the median function is super-additive. The super-additivity of the median function is equivalent to
Note that
Therefore, condition (19) is equivalent to
Let us de…ne non-negative random variables X + ; X ; Y + ; Y as
Therefore, condition (20) is equivalent to
A su¢ cient condition for (21) is
for all " > 0 , and with strict inequality for some open interval of ", because by setting " = Y + and " = X + , respectively, we obtain
and Pr Y + < X + < Pr Y < X + and thus (21). Since X and Y are I.I.D., the su¢ cient condition (22) reduces to Pr X + < " Pr X < " for all " > 0.
Equivalently, Pr (X m X < ") Pr (m X X < ") :
which simpli…es into the …rst inequality in (9). As we argued above, since m X 6 = X , we must have F X (m X ") + F X (m X + ") 1 < 0 for some positive measure of ", as desired. Finally, we show that condition (10) ((9), respectively) is satis…ed if F X is strictly convex (concave, respectively). Note that F (X) is uniformly distributed, so that E [F (X)] = 1=2. Suppose here that F is strictly convex. The concave case can be proved analogously. By Jensen's inequality
Hence, m X > X . In order to show that m X + m Y > m X+Y , it is su¢ cient to show that
Note that f X (m X + ") f X (m X ") > 0 by strict convexity of F , so F X (m X + ") + F X (m X ") is increasing in " and reaches a minimum at " = 0. Since F X (m X ) + F X (m X ) = 1, we must have F X (m X + ") + F X (m X ") 1 for all " > 0.
Examples for Section 3.3
We show here how the super-additivity condition of median is satis…ed for two wellknown families of distributions where condition (9) is not easily checked, or does not hold.
34
Consider …rst the large and important family of gamma distributions with density
This family contains the exponential (that can be obtained by setting = 1) and many other well known distributions. For any constant c > 0; the random variable cX is also gamma with parameters and =c. If X and Y are independent gamma with parameters ( X ; ) and ( Y ; ), respectively, then X + Y is also gamma with parameters ( X + Y ; ). Thus, the gamma family is closed under scaling and under convolution. In a classic study, Bock et al. [1987] showed that Pr (aX + bY t), 0 a; b 1, is Schur-convex in (a; b) for all t X . Since (1; 0)
, we have
F X (t) for all t X . Note that m X < X for gamma distributions (Groeneveld and Meeden [1977] ), so we have m1 34 Although the super-additivity (or sub-additivity) condition is derived for normalized distributions, it is straightward to verify that it is also su¢ cient for original distributions. 35 Alternatively, let m( ; ) denote the median of gamma random variable X with parameters and . Then m( ; ) = m( ; 1)= . Note that 
where the last equality follows from the de…nition of m + ( 4 ). Hence, m + ( 4 ) > p 2m X as desired.
By assuming independence between X and Y , we were able to derive operational, su¢ cient conditions for the =4 rotation to dominate the zero rotation, but independence is not necessary. We now present an example where, even though X and Y are correlated, the median function is super-additive (sub-additive) so the =4 rotation is welfare superior to the zero rotation. The standard tool we use to model correlation between X and Y for given marginals is the copula (see Nelson [2006] for an introduction).
Example 3 Suppose that X and Y are identically distributed on [0; 1] with marginals F X (x) = x 2 and F Y (y) = y 2 . To model correlation between X and Y , we consider here the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula
, m(2 ; 1) > 2m( ; 1):
The last inequality holds because, as shown in Berg and Pedersen [2008] , m( ; 1) is convex in . 36 If Z 1 ; Z 2 is a random sample of size 2 from a normal distribution N (0; 1) then the distribution of X = p Z 2 1 + Z 2 2 is Rayleigh: In other words, the Rayleigh is the distribution of the norm of a two-dimensional random vector whose coordinates are normally distributed. . It follows from the Sklar theorem that we can write the joint distribution F (x; y) in terms of its marginals and a copula C (p; q):
With some algebra, we can derive the joint density as f (x; y) = 4xy + 4 xy 2x 
Proof of Theorem 3
The proof follows the same steps as in proving Theorem 1. In order to show that = 0 is suboptimal, it is su¢ cient to show where Q T is the transpose of Q, and where I is the K K identity matrix. As a result Q 1 = Q T .
Each K K special orthogonal matrix Q transforms an orthogonal system X into another orthogonal system while preserving the orientation in R K . The transformed orthogonal system X is denoted as QX. The planner's objective is to choose Q in order to maximize welfare.
The (Sub)-Optimality of the Zero-and =4-Rotations
Theorem 1 can be easily extended to higher dimensions by applying our previous two-dimensional analysis to rotations of the …rst two dimensions only (while keeping all other dimensions …xed). Suppose now that X 1 ; :::; X K are I.I.D. drawn from a common distribution. What is the counterpart of =4 rotation (or equivalently the top-down procedure) in higher dimensions? We look for an orthogonal matrix Q that transforms X into a new vector QX whose one coordinate is given by the sum X 1 + ::: + X K while the other coordinates consists of various di¤erences. For example, if K = 4, the orthogonal matrix Q (with determinant equal to +1) is given by 
such that for all k 6 = K, b Q k X contains an equal number of X k 's appearing with positive and negative signs. The matrix b Q k is a Hadamard matrix, and the order of such a matrix must be 1; 2 or a multiple of 4. Sylvester [1867] constructed Hadamard matrices of order 2 k for every non-negative integer k. 37 In those cases it is easy to see that the same condition we had before, namely the super-additivity of the median function, is again su¢ cient for the =4-rotation to dominate the zero-rotation.
E¢ ciency Bounds
As in the main text, we work here with the non-normalized random variables X 1 ; :::; X K . With K dimensions, the expected utility of choosing marginal medians under an orthogonal transformation Q is given by
where Q k is the k-th row of the Q matrix. The …rst-best expected utility is P K k=1 var(Q k X). We de…ne the relative e¢ ciency of transformation Q relative to the …rst-best as:
Again, we can apply the Hotelling-Solomons inequality to obtain that EF (I)
Analogously, we can use the Basu-DasGupta inequality to show that, for unimodal distributions, we have
Now consider any even number K such that the Hadamard matrix exists. Suppose X 1 ; :::; X K are I.I.D. with log-concave densities. Consider again an orthogonal matrix b Q given in (27). It follows from the I.I.D. assumption that
Therefore, we have
Given that X 1 ; :::; X K have log-concave densities, the convolution Z P K k=1 X k also has a log-concave densities. Then the inequalities of Bobkov and Ledoux [2014] and of Ball and Böröczky [2010] together imply Hence,
